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Abstract
This study aims to better understand the evolutionary processes allowing species coexistence in eusocial insect
communities. We develop a mathematical model that applies adaptive dynamics theory to the evolutionary dynamics of
eusocial insects, focusing on the colony as the unit of selection. The model links long-term evolutionary processes to
ecological interactions among colonies and seasonal worker production within the colony. Colony population dynamics is
defined by both worker production and colony reproduction. Random mutations occur in strategies, and mutant colonies
enter the community. The interactions of colonies at the ecological timescale drive the evolution of strategies at the
evolutionary timescale by natural selection. This model is used to study two specific traits in ants: worker body size and the
degree of collective foraging. For both traits, trade-offs in competitive ability and other fitness components allows to
determine conditions in which selection becomes disruptive. Our results illustrate that asymmetric competition underpins
diversity in ant communities.
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Introduction
A fundamental challenge in community ecology is to under-
stand the mechanisms allowing species coexistence [1–5]. In ant
communities, competition for resources (e.g., nest sites and food) is
an important force in structuring the community [6,7], and
interspecific differences at both morphological and behavioral
levels represent important mechanisms of coexistence [8]. In many
ecosystems, coexisting ant species differ in worker body size and
colony foraging strategy [9–13]. In some Mediterranean ant
communities, for instance [12,13], mean worker body size ranges
from 1.6 mm to 10.0 mm across species. Moreover, species exploit
food resources differently. Some species forage individually:
foragers that discover a food resource do not share information
about resource location with nestmates. Other species forage
collectively by recruiting nestmates to the food resource. The level
of cooperation that characterizes collective foraging largely
depends on the kind of signal involved in communication between
nestmates (from antennal contact to long-lasting pheromone).
Trade-offs are frequently invoked to explain species coexistence
[14–16]. At the evolutionary time scale, they drive niche
differentiation processes, and contribute to the emergence of
diversity [17,18]. Several trade-offs have been identified in ant
communities, such as the trade-off between competitive domi-
nance and discovery abilities [10,19], the trade-off between
competitive dominance and thermal tolerance [12,20,21], and
the trade-off between competitive ability and vulnerability to
parasitoids [22,23]. The so-called dominance-discovery trade-off
refers to the negative correlation between the ability to defend
food resources and the ability to find them and is thought to
promote species coexistence [23,24]. The general aim of this paper
is to show how simple trade-offs, such as the dominance-discovery
trade-off, can lead to the emergence and persistence of diversity in
ant communities.
Adaptive dynamics theory [25–28] is a conceptual framework
that can be used to model the long-term dynamics of evolutionary
processes, specifically by analyzing the frequency-dependent
evolution of quantitative traits (or strategies). This approach
allows the modeling of phenomena such as evolutionary branch-
ing, during which a trait is driven to a value where selection
becomes disruptive and thus the trait splits into two trait values
that diverge gradually [27,29]. Adaptive dynamics is consequently
an efficient theoretical tool with which to test the emergence of
diversity. Adaptive Dynamics is an approximation based on i/
mutations are rare so that strategy dynamics at the evolutionary
timescale is a reflection of population dynamics at the ecological
timescale, and ii/reproduction is clonal: the only source of
differentiation between generations is mutation. This second
assumption is obviously not valid in ants, where most species
reproduce sexually. Nevertheless, if mutations are assumed to be
rare and to occur at a single locus, models using clonal
reproduction versus random mating in monomorphic diploid
populations yield similar conclusions regarding the occurrence of
evolutionary branching [30,31].
The challenge of modeling social insect colony fitness was first
taken up by Macevicz and Oster [32]. They proposed a model in
which a colony comprises two subunits: workers and sexuals (or
reproductives). The colony life cycle is divided into an ergonomic
phase (production of workers) and a reproductive phase (produc-
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tion of sexuals). During the ergonomic phase, the colony produces
workers until they reach a threshold number. Then, during the
reproductive phase, the energy that has been collected by workers
is channeled into the production of sexuals. Colony fitness depends
entirely on the production and success of reproductive adults. This
model fits with most ant colony cycles, in that sexual production
occurs annually and over a short time period that does not overlap
with worker production [8,33]. However, this modeling approach
does not take into account potential reproductive conflicts between
individuals within the colony, such as queen-worker or worker-
worker conflicts over male parentage. In eusocial Hymenoptera,
worker reproduction is prevented by behavioral mechanisms such
as queen-policing, worker-policing, and self-restraint, making
worker reproduction relatively rare in queenright colonies [34–
37]. The resolution of conflicts among the lower-level units thus
promotes the integrity of the higher-level unit: the colony. Ant
colonies can be considered to be superorganisms [38]: individuals
whose reproductive success determines the evolutionary outcome
[7]. Furthermore, non-reproductive, worker-based behaviors, such
as foraging, are expected to maximize overall energy intake for the
colony [39]. In this context, representing the colony as a single unit
and focusing on traits such as foraging strategy or worker size
seems to be a reasonable approach. In this study, we employ this
approach, ignoring any potential impacts of internal reproductive
conflicts.
In ant communities, coexisting species display differences in
morphology and foraging behavior. However, the factors under-
pinning the evolutionary processes that drive such trait differen-
tiation are poorly understood. The goals of the current paper are
to: i/propose a theoretical model that would enable the
identification of the factors allowing the emergence and mainte-
nance of diversity in ant communities, and ii/use this model to
study the diversity of both foraging strategies and worker body
sizes. The model links colony population dynamics to evolutionary
processes by applying the adaptive dynamics framework to ants.
The basic idea stems from the model of Macevicz and Oster [32]:
the whole colony is divided into two subunits, reproductives and
workers. Worker production is considered to be much faster than
colony reproduction. This assumption of different timescales
allows us to deterministically estimate the direction and speed of
the evolution of the whole colony using worker population size.
We applied this approach to study the evolutionary dynamics of
two specific traits: worker body size and foraging strategy [9]. We
examined the extent to which trade-offs might drive the evolution
of these traits.
General Model
We propose an adaptive dynamics model of the phenotypic
evolution of eusocial insects. This model is limited to clonal
reproduction. Phenotypic variation stems from mutations. Muta-
tions are assumed to be rare so that population dynamics attains its
population dynamical attractor between mutation events.
Resident Community Model
We considered a community composed of a single monomor-
phic population characterized by a quantitative scalar trait x. Each
colony of eusocial insects represents an individual. Colony
abundance is denoted by q (q for queen). Colony’s size (i.e. the
number of workers within colonies) is designated as w (w for
worker). The demography of population q (i.e. the number of
colonies) depends on the interactions of the colonies with their
surrounding environment. As the interacting agents are the
workers, the colony growth rate depends on the number of
workers per colony. Let the function F (q,w,x) be the colony
production rate. Colony population dynamics occurs at a longer
timescale (t), whereas within colony dynamics, i.e. that of the
worker population w, occurs at a shorter timescale (t). Let the
function G(q,w,x) be worker production rate.
The dynamics of the community is described by the system (R):
(R)
dq
dt
~ qF (q,w,x)
dw
dt
~ G(q,w,x)
8>><
>>:
Colony dynamics occurs at a far longer timescale than those of
worker production. This means that, during worker production,
the number of colonies can be regarded as constant. We assume
that worker population dynamics admits a stable and strictly
positive equilibrium w(q,x). Therefore, workers are produced
until a stable equilibrium w(q,x) is reached.
If we focus on the systemJs slower dynamics, the growth rate of
the population of colonies is described by the function
F (q,w(q,x),x). We assume that the populationJs dynamics has
a globally stable and strictly positive equilibrium q(x). In a
monomorphic community with trait x, the population abundance
is assumed to be constant at its equilibrium q(x) with number of
workers w(x)~w(q(x),x)).
Resident-Mutant Community Model
We now consider a community composed of a resident
monomorphic population, characterized by continuous trait x,
and a mutant population, with trait x’. The abundance of residents
and mutants is q and q’, and a colony’s size (i.e. the number of
workers in each kind of colony) is w and w’, respectively. The
community’s demography is described by the following system:
(RM)
dq
dt
~ qF (q,w,x,q’,w’,x’)
dq’
dt
~ q’F (q’,w’,x’,q,w,x)
dw
dt
~ G(q,w,x,q’,w’,x’)
dw’
dt
~ G(q’,w’,x’,q,w,x)
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
Colony population dynamics occurs at a far slower timescale. As
in the monomorphic case (Resident model R), both q and q1 can
be regarded as constant when considering faster system dynamics.
We assume that the worker system has a stable and positive
equilibrium (w(q,x,q’,x’),w(q’,x’,q,x)). Before any change in the
colony dynamics occurs, the worker system first reaches its stable
equilibrium.
The slow-dynamics system (RM) is thus given by:
(RM:s)
dq
dt
~qF (q,w(q,x,q’,x’),x,q’,w(q’,x’,q,x),x’)
dq’
dt
~q’F (q’,w(q’,x’,q,x),x’,q,w(q,x,q’,x’),x)
8><
>:
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Evolutionary Model
In the absence of mutants, the Resident-Mutant model
degenerates into the Resident model:
w(q,x,0,x’)~w(q,x)~w(x).
We assume that, prior to the emergence of any mutant
population, the resident population is constant at its equilibrium
(q(x),w(x)). When a mutant with trait x’ slightly different from
the resident trait x enters the community, it can either disappear
or invade. The fate of mutants is determined by their invasion
fitness Sx(x’), which represents the per capita growth rate of a very
scarce mutant population in a community composed exclusively of
residents:
Sx(x’)~F (0,w’,x’,q(x),w(x),x)
where w’~w(0,x’,q(x),x) represents the stable equilibrium
reached by the worker population in the scarce colonies of the
mutant population.
Since mutations have small phenotypic effect, a mutant’s fitness
may be linearized in the vicinity of the resident’s strategy. The
evolutionary dynamics is then predicted by the local fitness
gradient D(x) [29], defined as:
D(x)~ LSx(x’)
Lx’
Dx’~x
~
LF (0,w(x),x’,q(x),w(x),x)
Lx’
Dx’~x
z
LF (0,w’,x,q(x),w(x),x)
Lw’
Dw’~w|
Lw’
Lx’
Dx’~x
ð1Þ
Strategies for which the local fitness gradient is zero are called
singular strategies [27] (ss). The implicit function theorem allows
us to express the partial derivative of worker equilibrium w’ in
terms of function G (File S1). Conditions under which a strategy is
singular can thus be fully determined with F and G. To simplify
the equation, partial derivatives are denoted with superscripts (e.g.
LF (0,w,x’,q,w,x)
Lx’
Dx’~x is noted F 0,0,1,0,0,0(0,w,x,q,w,x), and w
and q denote w(q(x),x) and q(x).
xssZ0~F 0,0,1,0,0,0(0,w,x,q,w,x)zF 0,1,0,0,0,0(0,w,x,q,w,x)
|
G0,0,1,0,0,0(0,w,x,q,w,x)G0,1,0,0,0,0(q,w,x,0,w,x)
G0,0,0,0,1,0(0,w,x,q,w,x)G0,0,0,0,1,0(q,w,x,0,w,x)
{G0,0,0,0,0,1(q,w,x,0,w,x)G0,0,0,0,1,0(0,w,x,q,w,x)
{G0,1,0,0,0,0(q,w,x,0,w,x)G0,1,0,0,0,0(0,w,x,q,w,x)
ð2Þ
The evolution of a given trait in the monomorphic community
depends on the convergence and stability of these singular
strategies. On the one hand, a convergent stable strategy will be
gradually reached via small evolutionary steps [40]. On the other
hand, singular strategies that cannot be invaded by any proximate
mutants are called evolutionarily stable strategies [41]. The
property of evolutionarily stability depends only on the second
derivative of the invasion fitness function with respect to the
mutant strategy while the property of convergence stability
depends also on the second derivative of the invasion fitness with
respect to both the mutant strategy and the resident strategy
[27,29]. In this model, they can be determined according to F and
G. However, since the explicit conditions consist of extremely long
expressions, we do not detail the general case here.
Depending on the convergence stability and the evolutionary
stability of a singular point, different evolutionary scenarios unfold
[28]. For our purpose, two scenarios are of particular interest: i/
singular strategies that are both convergence stable and evolu-
tionary stable are evolutionary end points (sometimes called
continuously stable strategy in the literature); ii/singular strategies
that are convergence stable but that can be invaded by nearby
mutants are known as evolutionary branching points [27,29]. In
this case, when the monomorphic population reaches this strategy,
it experiences disruptive selection and splits into two diverging
subpopulations.
The evolutionary scenario of this dimorphic community can be
deduced from the analysis of evolutionary isoclines [42]. These
lines divide the set of possible two-strategy coexistence states into a
number of regions with different coevolutionary directions. They
consist of pairs of traits at which the invasion gradient of scarce
mutants in a community with two resident traits equal to zero. To
establish the evolutionary isoclines, the community with two traits
x1 and x2 is considered to be at equilibrium. Let q

1 and q

2 be the
equilibrium number of colonies associated with each strategy, and
w1 and w

2 their respective colony’s size. As in the monomorphic
case, the fate of scarce mutants is determined by their per capita
growth rate in the resident community:
S(x1,x2)(x’)~F (0,w’,x’,q1,w1,x1,q2,w2,x2)
where w’~w(0,x’,q1,x1,q

2,x2) represents the stable equilibrium
reached by the worker population in the mutant colonies.
Illustrating the Model
To illustrate this model, we present two specific examples of the
evolutionary dynamics of ant traits. The first example deals with
worker body size, a morphological trait. The second example deals
with the degree of cooperative foraging, a behavioral trait.
For both examples, colony and worker production rates were
specified with explicit functions. First, singular strategies and their
properties were identified analytically both in the general case and
by assigning a particular shape to their functions (Table 1). Then,
numerical calculations were used to predict the evolutionary
scenario that emerged in the monomorphic population as a result
of parameter values. Finally, in the case of a branching event,
evolutionary isoclines were drawn to determine the dynamics of a
community with two evolving strategies.
To test the robustness of the predictions based on the adaptive
dynamics approximation and delineate the conditions under
which a high degree of polymorphism can evolve, stochastic
simulations were performed. The simulations started with a
monomorphic community. At each evolutionary time step, a new
mutant appeared. Mutations were drawn from a truncated normal
distribution with a fixed variance and a mean given by the trait
value of the parent. Mutants were introduced at a low initial
frequency ( = 1%). The resident-mutant community varied at the
ecological timescale according to the population dynamics
specified by system (RM). The within-colony dynamics was set
to be 100 times faster than the colony dynamics. Strategies whose
abundance dropped below a threshold (frequency v 1
1000
) were
eliminated. The remaining strategies defined the new resident
community in the next evolutionary step.
Analyses were performed with Wolfram Mathematica 8.0
software.
Adaptive Dynamics Invade Eusocial Insects
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Evolutionary Dynamics of Worker Body Size
Let a community be composed of n strategies. Let strategy xi be
the mean worker body size. Let qi and wi be the number of
colonies and the colony’s size associated with the strategy xi,
respectively. The colony production rate F is represented by a
Lotka-Volterra competition model. It incorporates the per worker
colony intrinsic growth rate r(xi) weighted by the number of
workers wi, the effect of intraspecific competition a(xi,xi) weighted
by the number of conspecific workers qiwi , and the effect of
interspecific competition a(xi,xj) weighted by the number of
workers of other species qjwj (j=i). Overall, the effects of intra-
and interspecific competitive interactions on qi growth arePn
j~1 qjwja(xi,xj). The worker production rate G is a logistic
growth equation. Since both worker and colony production
depends on the energy entering the nest, G is also proportional to
the intrinsic colony growth rate wir(xi). In this example, we
assume that the production of workers is independent of the
interaction with neighboring colonies. However, we also assume
that total worker biomass is limited in the nest, leading to a
negative correlation between the maximum number of workers
and their size. Function k(x) (k(x)w0) represents colony’s size at
carrying capacity. The trade-off between the number of workers
and worker body size is translated mathematically by the
assumption k’(x)v0.
F (qi,wi,xi,q1,w1,x1,:::,qn,wn,xn)~wir(xi){
Pn
j~1
qjwja(xi,xj)
G(qi,wi,xi,q1,w1,x1,:::,qn,wn,xn)~wir(xi)(1{ wi
k(xi)
)
8><
>>:
ð3Þ
The general framework presented above enables us to identify
the singular strategies and their evolutionary properties according
to the shape of both F and G. The establishment of such
properties with the functions specified in system (3) allows us to
then classify these singular strategies according to the shape of
functions r, a, and k (Table 1).
Let x [½0,1 be the mean worker body size. The boundary is
fixed arbitrarily, and low values of x imply that workers are small
while high values signify that workers are large. Assuming that
worker loading capacity increases with body size [43], we suggest
that the per worker intrinsic growth rate is an increasing function
of x. Here, we choose the linear function
r(x)~x
Likewise, we assume that larger body size results in a
competitive advantage. A sigmoidal function was used for
a(x,x’) [30,44] (Fig. 1).
a(x,x’)~(1{
1
1zle{w(x{x’)
) ð4Þ
This function models the effect of an x’-colony on an x-colony.
Parameters w (w§0) and l (lw0) shape the strength of compe-
tition. Competition asymmetry w only operates on interspecific
competition and emphasizes the difference between strategies: the
higher the value, the more important a small difference in
strategies will be. On the other hand, l applies to both intra- and
interspecific competition and will be referred to as competition
intensity.
We assume a negative correlation between colony’s size
carrying capacity and worker body size. We used the linear
function:
k(x)~1{x
The evolutionary scenario can be predicted from the stability
and convergence of the singular strategies (Table 1). Long-term
evolution depends on the interplay between both competition
intensity l and competition asymmetry w (Fig. 2.a). Two scenarios
occur. First, if either competition intensity or competition
asymmetry is weak (lv2 or wv10z l
5
in Fig. 2.a), long-term
evolution results in a single monomorphic strategy. This strategy is
called the evolutionary end point [45]. Second, if both competition
intensity and competition asymmetry are strong (lw2 and
ww10z l
5
), the system evolves toward an evolutionary branching
point: directional evolution turns into disruptive selection, and the
resident community becomes dimorphic.
The fate of the dimorphic community emerging from the
branching event depends on the convergence and stability of the
evolutionary isoclines (Fig. 3. (a,b)). After a branching event, there
are two possible outcomes. First, if competition is intermediate
(intermediate values of l and w), the dimorphic community
reaches a stable coalition, and the two equilibrium strategies
coexist. Second, if competition is strong (high values of l and w),
the dimorphic community evolves toward a convergent singular
coalition of strategies that is evolutionarily unstable, predicting the
occurrence of more branching events. The resident community
will reach higher levels of polymorphism.
These predictions were confirmed by our simulations (Fig. 3.
(c,d)). In the case of intermediate competition (l~5, w~10), the
two strategies stably coexist in the community. Colonies with big
workers are more abundant but contain fewer workers than
colonies with small workers. In the case of strong competition
(l~10, w~30), the community undergoes four branching events,
reaching a stable equilibrium of five different body sizes. As in the
former case, bigger workers mean more abundant but smaller
colonies. The number of branching events depends on the
intensity and asymmetry of competition: higher values of w and
larger differences between w and l tend to increase the number of
coexisting separate branches in the simulated evolutionary tree.
During the simulations, the difference between slow and fast
timescales can be relaxed by letting worker production dynamics
to be as fast as colony production dynamics. The simulation results
are qualitatively similar: the evolutionary scenarios are identical
but occur much more slowly.
Evolutionary Dynamics of Foraging Strategies
In this example, the worker production rate is no longer
restricted by the strategy-dependent colony’s size at carrying
capacity. We assume that worker production suffers as a result of
competition with neighboring colonies in accordance with a
Lotka-Volterra competition model. The equation for worker
production G thus includes the intrinsic colony growth rate
wir(xi), and a carrying capacity scaled to 1 implying that worker
production is restrained both by itself and by the competitive
weight of the neighboring colonies. The equation for colony
production rate F remains the same as previously.
Adaptive Dynamics Invade Eusocial Insects
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F (qi,wi,xi,q1,w1,x1,:::,qn,wn,xn)~wir(xi){
Pn
j~1
qjwja(xi,xj)
G(qi,wi,xi,q1,w1,x1,:::,qn,wn,xn)~wir(xi)
(1{(wiz
Pn
j~1
qjwja(xi,xj))
8>>><
>>>:
ð5Þ
Let x [½0,1 be the degree of cooperation between workers
during foraging. Low values of x denote weak cooperation. For
instance, x~0 would represent strict individual foraging. Con-
versely, high values stand for highly collective strategies such as
mass recruitment. We consider that x underpins the dominance-
discovery trade-off [24]: at high values of x (x?1), the colony is a
good competitor but a poor discoverer. Conversely, at low values
of x (x?0), the colony is a weak competitor but good at resource
discovery. The per worker intrinsic growth rate r(x) takes into
account both food discovery and food exploitation. The ability to
discover food rapidly is negatively correlated with the degree of
collective foraging. However, the ability to exploit a food resource
might increase with collective foraging, depending on food type.
To model the per worker intrinsic growth rate, we use the
following polynomial:
r(x)~(1{x)(1zcx)
where c§0 represents the advantage of cooperative foraging in
food exploitation. We can imagine, for instance, that if resources
are of small size, recruiting nestmates to them does not present any
advantage, and c would thus tend to 0. On the other hand, if food
resources are large, recruitment might accelerate the exploitation
process, and the value of c would be high. Note that, for c[½0,1,
r(x) is maximized by x^~0 (individual foraging); and for cw1, the
per worker intrinsic growth rate is maximized by an intermediate
degree of cooperation x^~
c{1
2c
. Function r(x) is thus an
unimodal function that represents how the degree of cooperation
increases the food exploitation process but decreases the food
resource discovery. x^ would be the optimal strategy in a
community without competition (a(x,x’)~0,Vx’).
When colonies interact with each other, the advantage
conferred by cooperation depends on the strategies of the two
competitors: the larger the difference between x and x’, the lower
Table 1. Mathematical conditions identifying the singular strategies and their properties of evolutionary stability and
convergence.
Example 1: evolution of worker body size
General case
a/
r(x)k’(x)zk(x)(r’(x){r(x)
a(1,0)(x,x)
a(x,x)
)
= 0
b/
r’’(x)k(x){r(x)(
2k’(x)2
k(x)
z
k(x)a2,0(x,x){2k’(x)a1,0(x,x)
a(x,x)
)
, 0
c/
r’’(x)k(x)zr(x)(k’’(x){
2k’(x)2
k(x)
z
k(x)a(0,1)(x,x)a(1,0)(x,x)
a(x,x)2
z
2k’(x)a(1,0)(x,x){k(x)(a(1,1)(x,x)za(2,0)(x,x))
a(x,x)
)
, 0
Specific functions
a/ 1zlzx(w(1{x){2(1zl)) = 0
b/ (2(1zl)(1zl{w(1{x))zw2(1{l)(1{x)2) . 0
c/ (2(1zl)(1zl{w(1{x))zw2(1{x)2) . 0
Example 2: evolution of foraging strategy
General case
a/ r’(x)a(x,x){r(x)(1zr(x))a(1,0)(x,x) = 0
b/ r00(x)a(x,x)2(1zr(x))zr(x)2a(1,0)(x,x)(r(x)a(0,1)(x,x){(2zr(x)(3z2r(x))a(1,0)(x,x)))
z a(x,x)r(x)(1zr(x))(r(x)a(1,1)(x,x)za(2,0)(x,x))
, 0
c/ r00(x)a(x,x)2zr(x)(1zr(x))a(1,0)(x,x)(a(0,1)(x,x){2r(x)a(1,0)(x,x))
{ a(x,x)r(x)(1zr(x))(a(1,1)(x,x)za(2,0)(x,x))
, 0
Specific functions
a/ w(1{x)(1zcx)
1zl
z
1zc(1{2x)
{2zx(1{c(1{x))
= 0
b/ 2c(1zl)2zw2(1{x)(1zcx)(4z(1{c(1{x))x)({5{lz2(1{c(1{x))x)
{2zx(1{c(1{x))
, 0
c/ 2c(1zl)2zw2(1{x)(1zcx)({2z(1{c(1{x))x)({3z2(1{c(1{x))x)
{2zx(1{c(1{x))
, 0
Strategy properties of the different models as a function of the convexity of the per worker intrinsic growth rate r(x), the competitive kernel a(x,x’), and the colony’s
size at carrying capacity k(x). In both examples, mathematical conditions have been simplified assuming x[D0,1D and depend on competition intensity l, competition
asymmetry w, and parameter c. a/conditions for x to be a singular strategy; b/condition for x to be an evolutionary stable strategy; c/conditions for x to be a convergent
stable strategy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055159.t001
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the impact of x’-colonies on x-colonies and the higher the impact
of x-colonies on x’-colonies. The same function as was used
previously was employed to model the effect of x’-colonies on x-
colonies (Eq. 1).
The evolutionary scenario can be predicted from the conditions
for convergence and stability at a singular point (Table 1). Two
different patterns are possible and depend on the competition
parameters (Fig. 2.b). If competition intensity or competition
asymmetry is weak (lv3 or wv20z l
2
in Fig. 2.b), the unique
equilibrium of the evolutionary dynamics is an end point: the
monomorphic community evolves until reaching a strategy that
cannot be invaded by any nearby mutants. If both competition
intensity and competition asymmetry are strong (lw3 and
ww20z l
2
), the singular strategy loses its evolutionary stability.
Evolution leads the monomorphic community to this value, and
selection then becomes disruptive. After this branching event, two
strategies appear and diverge from each other.
The structure of the evolutionary isoclines allows us to
determine the dynamics of the two strategies after the branching
event. According to the arrows indicating the direction of
evolution (Fig. 4.a), one of the strategies increases while the other
decreases. The evolutionary isocline towards which the two
strategies evolve loses its evolutionary stability (x1~0:85,
x2~0:6 in Fig. 4.a), thereby causing a second branching event.
The community then reaches a higher degree of polymorphism.
Stochastic simulations confirm this pattern (Fig. 4.b). As
predicted, the monomorphic community first evolves to a
branching point and becomes dimorphic. It then undergoes a
second branching event followed by a third. Four different
strategies coexist in the community. Colonies using the most
collective strategy (x~0:9) are slightly more abundant than others.
Simulations allow us to determine the number of workers
associated with each strategy. Colony’s size appears to be
positively correlated with the degree of cooperation in foraging.
Parameter c affects the value of coexisting strategies. If the
advantage of collective foraging is low with respect to the per
worker intrinsic growth rate r (e.g., for c~0), coexisting strategies
are distributed between x~0 and x~0:9. Higher c values increase
the value of the lesser-valued strategies. For instance, for c~2,
strategies are distributed between x~0:4 and x~0:9. The
number of coexisting strategies depends on the intensity and
asymmetry of competition: Increasing w or w{l augments the
number of branching events. Simulations in which the difference
between timescales was relaxed show that the results are
qualitatively equivalent, but that more evolutionary time is needed
to produce the patterns.
Discussion
This work presents a model that can be used to study the
evolutionary dynamics of life history traits or specific behaviors in
eusocial insects. Two examples that consider the evolutionary
dynamics of worker body size and foraging strategies in ants are
developed. They show how simple trade-offs can explain the
emergence and maintenance of different strategies in a community
depending on the interplay between intra- and interspecific
competition.
This work shows how adaptive dynamics theory can be applied
to eusocial insect societies. The classic model of Macevicz and
Oster [32] considers a colony as being divided into workers and
sexuals and defines fitness as the rate of sexual production. Our
model is inspired by this work but instead considers insect societies
in a long-term evolutionary perspective. In the majority of ant
societies, workers do not reproduce [34–37], and thus the ant
colony can be regarded as an individual, whose reproductive
success determines the evolutionary outcome for the species [7].
Therefore, we assume that selection exclusively acts at the level of
the whole colony, with colony fitness depending on its size, i.e. its
number of workers. The simplifying assumptions are that colony
development (i.e. worker production) is a faster process than
colony reproduction (i.e. production of new colonies). Colony
development and reproduction are defined by a slow-fast system of
differential equations that represent colony population dynamics.
Interactions between different colony populations define the
community’s dynamics. This dynamics, which operates at the
Figure 1. Function a(x,x’) as a function of x{x’. Red full lines show how increasing competition asymmetry affects a(x,x’): w~0, light red; w~2,
red, w~20, dark red (l~1 for all red lines). Blue dashed lines show the effect of competition intensity: l~0:5, light blue; l~1, blue; l~5, dark blue
(w~5 for all blue lines).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055159.g001
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ecological timescale, drives the evolutionary process at the
evolutionary timescale. The model relies on a strong assumption:
clonal reproduction. In ants, this is the exception rather than the
rule (but see [46–50]), and it raises some questions about our
results. In particular, to what extent can conclusions from clonal
models of adaptive dynamics be applied to populations of sexual
organisms? The conditions for evolutionary branching derived
from clonal populations also apply to sexual population (under
some conditions: for a discussion of this topic see [51, Section 2.6]),
meaning that scenarios leading to the selection of a single strategy
before the branching event occurs, are preserved with sexual
reproduction. However, once evolutionary branching occurs,
random mating and recombination might recreate intermediate
phenotypes and thereby prevent the emergence of discrete cluster.
Thus, different mechanisms creating phenotypic variation due to
evolutionary branching exist [52]. In one of the scenarios,
disruptive selection could favor assortative mating and therefore
improve the degree of reproductive isolation [31]. In this case,
results from the clonal model are restored, and trait diversification
from branching events might even lead to sympatric speciation.
The first version of our model incorporates a trade-off between
worker size and number, by considering that they were negatively
correlated. At the colony level, this becomes a trade-off between
colony size and competitive ability. The intrinsic growth rate (i.e.
the growth rate of colonies assuming neither intra- or inter-specific
competition) is maximized by medium sized worker (x~0:5).
However, these colonies are outcompeted by colonies with larger
worker (xw0:5). This model predicts different evolutionary
outcomes. When competition asymmetry is strong relative to
competition intensity, the model predicts the emergence of species
with different mean worker body sizes in the community. This
prediction fits with observations of natural communities, in which
differences in worker body size are associated with resource
subdivision [9]. For instance, in harvester ants, worker body size is
positively correlated with the size of the seeds the species
preferentially collects [9,53–55]. For simplicity’s sake, we only
considered the mean worker body size in the colony. However, in
social insects, castes are a fundamental part of colonial organiza-
tion [39]: polymorphism promotes the division of labor. With
regards to body size, colony polymorphism enhances diet breadth
[54] and is negatively correlated to species diversity in the
community [53]. To gain a better understanding of the evolution
of worker body size, it might thus be important to include a high
degree of colony polymorphism by differentiating workers by caste
or size class. Functional specialization might be favored by natural
selection, depending on the traits involved in different tasks, and
their respective performance efficiency [56]. Size polymorphism
within a colony could thus evolve if the gain in performance
associated with the different sizes is high enough.
The second trait considered in our model is the foraging system.
Since collectively foraging species are superior at interference
competition, we could have expected that strong competitive
pressure would favor the evolutionary stability of collective
foraging strategies. In contrast, collective foraging also seems to
be favored when competition is weak. On the other hand, when
the overall level of competition intensity (both intra- and inter-
specific) is strong relative to inter-specific competition, the initially
monomorphic community becomes polymorphic, with different
degrees of collective foraging coexisting. Regardless of the
ancestral strategy, foraging evolves to become collective. However,
when all colonies adopt this strategy, selection becomes disruptive,
and negative frequency-dependent selection favors the appearance
of divergent strategies. The stable community composition at the
end of the evolutionary process depends on the strength of
competition. Generally, the stronger the effect of competition, the
higher the number of coexisting strategies. Furthermore, in
environments in which collective foraging does not afford a
distinct advantage in exploiting food resources, coexisting strate-
gies might vary from completely individual to highly collective, as
occurs in some Mediterranean ant communities that include
foraging strategies such as individual foraging, tandem running,
group recruitment, and mass recruitment [12]. Indeed, in those
communities, the performance of collectively foraging species
might be reduced because of high temperatures [57], which would
allow the whole range of foraging strategies to co-evolve and
coexist. In summary, even a simple model might explain the
appearance and coexistence of foraging strategies involving
different degrees of collective behavior.
Many studies on the optimality of collective foraging behavior
agree on the importance of the number of individuals and
conclude that collective foraging is optimal for large colonies [58–
60]. Since a positive correlation between colony size and the
Figure 2. Evolutionary outcomes of life history traits (a: worker body size, b: degree of cooperative foraging) as a function of the
interplay between competition intensity l and asymmetry w. Singular strategies are color-labeled according to their evolutionary properties.
Parameter pairs leading to an evolutionary ending point are in gray (both Ess and Css) and the dashed surface corresponds to evolutionary branching
points (Css, but not Ess). Note that competition intensity cannot be null (l=0): without competition, the resident population would not be limited
(a(x,x)~0) and would tend to infinity, thus the assumption of a stable resident population would be transgressed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055159.g002
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degree of communication in ant foraging behavior has been
established [61], the trend seems to be that each colony’s size
corresponds to a given optimal foraging strategy. A model
incorporating an explicit function for worker production relaxes
the need to make preliminary assumptions about colony’s size.
Furthermore, colony’s size can instead be predicted as an
evolutionary outcome. When worker production depends on
competitive interactions with neighboring colonies, the predicted
colony’s sizes are positively correlated with the degree of
cooperation characterizing the foraging strategies. Indeed, forag-
ing with more collective strategies increases competitiveness,
which in turn increases colony growth. This model can thus serve
as a heuristic basis to illustrate the co-evolution between foraging
strategy and colony’s size.
Figure 3. Evolution of worker body size predicted by (a-b) evolutionary isoclines and illustrated by (c–d) simulated evolutionary
trees: a,c: stable dimorphism (l~5, w~10), b,d: increasing levels of polymorphism as a result of repeated branching events (l~10,
w~30). (a–b) Shaded areas are regions of possible coexistence between strategies x1 and x2 . Arrows indicate the direction of evolution. Thick (resp.
dashed) isoclines represent fitness maxima (resp. minima). (c–d) Blue trees represent the relative numbers of colonies using a given strategy (the
darker the blue, the more common the strategy). Red trees represent the associated colony’s size (the darker the red, the more workers present in the
colony). Simulations start with a monomorphic community of medium-sized workers (x~0:5). Genetic variance is estimated to be ~0:01. The
ecological timescale is assumed to be 1000 times faster than the evolutionary timescale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055159.g003
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Both examples presented emphasize the importance of com-
petitive trade-offs for the emergence and coexistence of different
strategies within the same community. Trade-offs between
competitive abilities and other fitness components such as
mortality [62], colonization capacity [14,63], or resource exploi-
tation [15,24] are often suggested as an explanation for species
coexistence. Furthermore, the emergence of different species (or
sets of individuals using a given strategy) can be made possible by
the degree of competition asymmetry present in such trade-offs
[30,44]. In both models presented in this work, more intense
competition enhanced community diversity. In fact, highly
competitive interactions made selection disruptive, and thereby
provoked strategy divergence. In these examples, competition
asymmetry is a requisite for strategy divergence. If competition
were symmetric, there would not have any branching event. In
these models, highly asymmetric competition means that two
populations with slightly different strategies have very different
effect on the growth rate of the other population. Conditions for
strategy divergence appear when the gain in competitive ability is
balanced by a loss in intrinsic growth rate. This strategy
divergence resulted in specialization in either a morphological
(i.e. worker body size) or a behavioral (i.e. foraging strategy) trait.
Competition drives niche shift and character displacement until
the community stabilizes. In the example on worker body size, the
different niches at equilibrium might be reduced to either i/few
colonies of many medium sized workers that maximize their
intrinsic growth rate, but present low competitive ability; or ii/
many colonies of few large workers with a lower intrinsic growth
rate, and high competitive ability. Similarly, in the example on
foraging strategies, colonies invest either in i/high intrinsic growth
rate per worker with a low number of workers per colony
(implying low intra-specific competition) and a low competitive
ability for inter-specific interactions; or in ii/lower intrinsic growth
rate per worker with many workers in the colony (meaning high
intra-specific competition) and a high competitive ability. The
model thus allows us to assess the ghost of competition past [64],
which may be responsible for community structure in resource-
limited ant communities [9].
This study focuses on social insects and considers the colony to
be the unit of selection. Natural selection is modeled by assuming
that the fitness of colonies depends explicitly on the energy
accumulated by workers. This approach could be extended to the
study of evolutionary processes in other social systems that comply
with the following assumptions: i/reproduction can be represented
as being carried out by a collective entity; ii/the reproduction of
this collective entity occurs at a much slower rate than the
production of its interacting agents.
Supporting Information
File S1 The implicit function theorem applied to
workers production allows to explicit analytical expres-
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